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Use of Militia in the American Revolution

The militia played an important role for the American’s during the Revolutionary War. The engaged in harassing tactics, intelligence gathering, and major battles. In the early part of the war, New Jersey militia surprised American commanders by interdicting British foraging units and affecting British morale through constant harassing tactics.[1] While many American commanders took a dim view of the capabilities of the militia, they were effective depending on how commanders utilized them in combat.[2]

An example of a failed usage occurred at the Battle of Camden in 1780. In an ill-conceived battle plan, General Gates deployed his regulars against loyalist forces and placed his militia to confront the hardened British regulars.[3] This deployment made the outcome inevitable; the regulars held their own and even gained the upper hand against the British loyalists, while the militia panicked when the British regulars attacked.[4] For the militia to be effective, they needed proper leadership and a sound strategy. Daniel Morgan was one American commander who knew how to use them with great success.

Daniel Morgan organized a group of militia into a rifle company that achieved significant battlefield accomplishments at the Battle of Saratoga.[5] One way Morgan used the militia effectively was to capitalize on the average militia soldier’s ability to fire a rifle accurately. This fact and the militia’s ability to fire and maneuver was something Morgan used not only in unconventional tactics, but also in major battles, such as at the Battle of Cowpens in 1781.

During this battle, and in the days leading up to it, Morgan used the militia in all capacities. The militia provided intelligence gathering services and harassment actions against the pursuing British force, and Morgan used them in a rather ingenious battle plan during the actual battle. Morgan set his force up in three lines, riflemen acting as skirmishers first, then a line of, militia, and then the regulars, with the cavalry in reserve. [6] The skirmishers would target the initial British advance and then retreat behind the militia, who would fire three times, targeting officers when possible, and then retreat behind the regulars.[7] In this way, the militia would have an opportunity to retreat to relative safety after they fired their volley at the enemy; it also had the effect of weakening the British line before the regulars engaged them. While this took place, the skirmishers and militia also flanked the British line while the British engaged the American regulars.[8]  Likewise, the American cavalry rode around the British lines and struck the other flank, suddenly, the British were in retreat.[9] The proper use of militia at Cowpens won the battle for the Americans.

Morgan capitalized on the known British disdain for the militia by luring the British into a trap at Cowpens and achieving victory.[10] Morgan had placed his force in such a way that he would be able to exploit the British when the militia withdrew. Morgan knew that the British would assume the militia’s withdrawal was a retreat and when the British took the bait, Morgan unleashed his cavalry reserve and turned the battle in the American’s favor.[11] Morgan demonstrated at Saratoga and Cowpens that the proper use of militia in a battle could produce significant results.

Works Cited

Ferling, John. Almost a Miracle, The American Victory in the War of Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

O’Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. The Men Who Lost America, British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.

 

[1] John Ferling, Almost a Miracle, The American Victory in the War of Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 207 and 208.

[2] Ibid., 208-209.

[3] Ibid., 441.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 266.

[6] Ferling, Almost a Miracle, The American Victory in the War of Independence, 480-482.

[7] Ibid., 482.

[8] Ibid., 486.

[9] Ibid.

[10] O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, 266.

[11] Ibid., 267.

Were the Confederates Traitors?

The short answer to this question, in my opinion, is that the Confederates were traitors, and the men who left the United States Army to join the Confederate Army doubly so in light of the fact they went against the oath they took upon joining the military to protect the country. All Confederates were traitors just as the American Colonial rebels were traitors to the British Government in 1775. That being said, their reasons for rebelling against the central government are understandable if one approaches the issues in a dispassionate manner. The reasons were numerous, and were not simply about slavery, in fact, the reason slavery was so vital to the southern states was that their economic livelihood depended on the institution of slavery for survival, a practice that began in colonial times when people were willing to enslave others out of economic necessity.[1] This does not make slavery justifiable; nothing does justify that abhorrent practice. There is also, of course, the element of racial superiority many whites felt towards Africans that makes the institution more reprehensible. The fact that the Confederates were willing to rebel to save that institution, then the Federal government was well within its rights to crush the rebellion and treat the men who left the United States military to serve in the Confederate military as traitors.

Unfortunately, slavery was not the issue that galvanized the Federal Government initially, and the founding fathers should have settled the slavery issue in 1783 when the United States became an independent nation. A country that sets its foundation on the premise that “All men are created equal” should have ensured all mankind really was equal. While there are numerous reasons why this did not happen, and far too involved to go into here, the question was not settled, and slavery persisted. The southern states continued to rely on slavery to maintain their economy, and the predisposition to view the slaves as less than human allowed the practice to continue.

During the Eighteen hundreds, however, states took precedence over country for many Americans, thus being Virginian or Pennsylvanian outweighed being an American. In fact, the original colonies were set up as separate governments by the British and only “united” following the American Revolution. There is a long history of rivalry and animosity between many of the states, and regional disputes between the northern and the southern states. When objectively taken into account, these factors demonstrate how the southern states could rebel, and how the citizens of those states could support the decision and join the Confederate cause. These reasons may not be valid for rebelling against the country they helped to create, or to go against the oath of office that the men who left the US military took upon entering military service. Understanding the economic, religious, regional, and political history of the thirteen colonies turned states, helps to understand why they made the decision to become traitors to their country. Studying the various aspects of history aids in understanding why many people rebel against the authority of their country or crown, much as a small band of traitors rebelled against the British Monarchy and created the United States.

Works Cited

Fontaine, Peter. “Reverend Peter Fontaine to Moses Fontaine, 1757.” In Colonial Triangular Trade: An Economy Based on Human Misery, by Phyllis Raybin Emert, 18-19. Carlisle: Discovery Books, 1995

[1] Peter Fontaine, “Reverend Peter Fontaine to Moses Fontaine, 1757,” in Colonial Triangular Trade: An Economy Based on Human Misery, ed. Phyllis Raybin Emert (Carlisle: Discovery Books, 1995), 18.