By

Daniel H. Boone

The desire to maintain British power of prestige in Europe through the economic power of her colonies, and particularly the West Indies, was the driving force behind British strategy in the American Revolution after it expanded into a global conflict with the entry of France, Spain, and later the Netherlands on the American side. British military victories late in the war, and the retention of the remainder of her Empire outside of the American colonies and Florida, allowed the British to maintain a significant level of power in Europe. Even with the loss of the thirteen colonies, retaining the remainder of their Empire would aid the British in the coming conflict against Napoleon Bonaparte’s France.

            The American Revolution is widely viewed as a resounding defeat for Great Britain as the rebellious American colonies gained their independence with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 3 September 1783. Great Britain lost a sizable portion of their Empire and seemingly lost a war. Many historians give credit to the importance of the West Indies; however, few have explored in depth just how important the area was to the conflict as a whole. Many of the studies focus on a singular aspect of American and/or British economic, military, or political actions that involved the Caribbean, but none focused on the theater’s importance in its entirety. This is an essential aspect of the American Revolution to explore, for it was from the British concentration on the West Indies that they retained much of their Empire, and thus their wealth and power on a global scale.

Following the end of the war, the British preserved the vast majority of their Empire, and arguably, the most economically lucrative portions. Canada, India, and the West Indies all remained under British control. Great Britain also maintained its possessions and strategic position in the Mediterranean Ocean with the retention of Gibraltar, although they relinquished Minorca to the Spanish during the peace negotiations.

During these negotiations, however, the British actively sought to play upon the differences between American, French, and Spanish interests to their own benefit.[1] Indeed, of all the belligerents, the British emerged from the conflict with the most stable economy and the most powerful military, particularly their navy. These are important facts, crucial in helping to understand how the British rebounded to defeat Napoleon Bonaparte’s France in the early nineteenth century. This latter development also gave rise to a second British Empire.

            Great Britain’s role not only in Europe but also in the world rested on the premise of power of prestige, or British global economic and military power. To maintain the balance of power in Europe, the British needed to remain powerful. To have a great Empire meant power, so long as that Empire produced wealth for the mother country.  Thus, the British focused their strategy during her many wars for Empire on maintaining her more lucrative colonies, such as the profitable sugar colonies in the West Indies, and in acquiring new colonies to add to the Empire. The economic importance of the Caribbean colonies did not change during the American Revolution, and after the war expanded to a global conflict with the entry of France, Spain, and the Netherlands, British strategy focused on the West Indies.

            In order to protect their bases in the Mediterranean, their colonies in the Caribbean, India, and North America, as well as the associated trade routes, the British needed to maintain a powerful navy. The Royal Navy had many uses, such as protection of the sea-lanes, which commerce flowed upon, projecting force in various areas around the globe, and as a means to transport war material such as artillery and soldiers. The British, however, failed to maintain this navy during the interwar years of 1763 to 1775. This invariably led to problems for the British in governing their colonies.

            The economic, political, and military situations in the various colonies directly influenced the British ability to enforce laws, protect trade, and project force. The failure of the British government to maintain a navy capable of dealing with this myriad of issues created the situation they found themselves in when war broke out in the American colonies in 1775. Revamping that navy to meet the expected threat from the Bourbon powers of France and Spain placed an enormous strain on the British.

            When France formally entered the war in 1778, followed by Spain in 1779, Great Britain faced two powerful navies that when combined, outnumbered her own. When hostilities erupted with the Dutch in 1780, the British faced three sizable naval enemies. The economic, political, and military situation the British found themselves in was severe, and even threatened the survival of the Empire. The British strategy during these crucial years centered on protecting the home islands and their wealthy colonies. Confronted by three European maritime enemies, not to mention the growing power of the American navy and privateers, the British badly needed to bolster their own navy. British maritime power was vital not only to defend against the increasing number of enemies, but also to secure the Caribbean theater and the economically vital sea routes.

            As the Royal Navy was not of a size to do battle around the globe, the British had to prioritize their colonial interests, and their enemies. The British East India Company, despite financial problems, maintained India, and this freed up military resources for the British to concentrate elsewhere. The British also held Canada in relative security, and holding Canada directly supported the West Indies. By comparison, the American waters were a convoluted series of streams, rivers, lakes, and coastal areas, far too numerous for the British to effectively monitor or blockade. The West Indies, however, were not only economically important, they were also not in any stage of revolt, nor did they appear to be inclined to join the mutinous colonies on the mainland. With these factors in mind, the British placed the retention of maintaining control of the Canadian and Caribbean colonies over actively suppressing the American rebellion. This decision to prioritize their enemies made France and Spain the primary focus of British strategy. 

            Great Britain stumbled into a conflict in 1775 unprepared, and shockingly out of touch with the political changes in North America and Europe. As mentioned, when the war expanded from a rebellion of thirteen colonies to a global conflict, the British lacked the resources, and particularly the allies, to prosecute the war on all fronts. In prioritizing their colonies, the British realized that they would lose part, if not all of the thirteen colonies, then in revolt. While the loss of the American colonies seriously weakened Britain’s power of prestige, the retention of the more economically lucrative West Indies, as well as India, would ensure Great Britain’s international standing. The West Indies were a key element to the British economy, and as such, Great Britain devoted vast amounts of resources to preserving their hold on this vital territory during the war.

            To ensure the preservation of the Caribbean, the British changed their strategy in North America. They went on the defensive in the American colonies, only holding out a southern strategy in hopes of retaining some of the southern colonies such as Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. The British diverted troops from North America to the Caribbean, and the focus of the Royal Navy, aside from protecting the home waters, became the Caribbean. When it came to choosing between their North American possessions, the Caribbean came first, Canada second, and the thirteen American colonies third.

            The Caribbean was vital for the flow of revenue and trade, and thus Canada, particularly in light of the loss of revenue to the American possessions, was vital to keep the Caribbean colonies supplied. In short, Great Britain could survive, even thrive, without the American colonies, but without the West Indies, and to a lesser degree Canada, she may well lose her Empire.

            The fact that the British emerged from the war in a relatively strong position came about because they shifted their war strategy and naval tactics to fight and win a global war.[2] They lost a portion of their Empire, but they also retained important areas, including consolidating their hold on India. Thus, while they suffered defeat in the American colonies, they were victorious elsewhere. The war also taught the British the need for change and far from becoming despondent, some saw a vast amount of opportunity in the future with the new United States.

            In 1783 a pamphlet appeared that was likely penned by a minister named Andrew Kippis, assumed to be writing for William Petty, the Earl of Shelburne and Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1782 to 1783. The pamphlet is interesting for its positive and reconciliatory tone towards the Americans. Part of the pamphlet states, “since the Independence of America hath been reasonably and unavoidably acknowledged, it is our business to make the best use of an event which can never be recalled.”[3] The tone here is frank, it acknowledges that the war is lost, but now let us make the best of the situation for our own benefit. The tone is not that of defeat, and interestingly the pamphlet goes on to describe the economic benefits of the new United States to the British.

            In describing the potential of trade with the new nation, the pamphlet suggests, “the benefits of our trade with her may be greater than ever.”[4] This statement underlines the fact that the British saw a potential lucrative opportunity in trade with America, and a continuation of the triangular trade between Europe, Africa, and North America. The British thus sought a quick reconciliation with their former colonies. The British could afford to be positive and not defeatist, for as mentioned, they retained the majority of their Empire.

            The British certainly could not claim a decisive victory; in fact, the terms of the Peace of Paris were decidedly unfavorable to Britain, but the British Empire, although reduced, survived.[5] Those terms need not have been as disadvantageous as they were for the British could have continued the war had they so desired. After Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in October 1781, and many presumed the war over, the British still held New York City, Charleston, most of Georgia, St. Augustine in Florida, and Canada; while the Americans had lost the use of the French navy, which had headed south to battle the Royal Navy in the Caribbean.[6] The pamphlet referenced above is some indication of why the British did agree to favorable terms for the Americans. They knew the war in the thirteen colonies was lost, continuing the conflict would accomplish little. The British, therefore, turned to defeating the French and Spanish, and creating a future economic partner in the United States. The retention of the majority of her territory, and winning the peace with the Americans, preserved the British Empire.

            The preservation of her Empire would have a long-standing influence on later events in Europe. The naval defeat of France and Spain in the war, however, was the factor that greatly aided British power in Europe.[7] The key battle was the Battle of the Saintes in April 1782. The British victory in that battle not only seriously damaged French naval power, but also served as the incident that deprived the Americans of the French fleet, which hampered colonial military efforts in the months following the victory at Yorktown. Without the aid of the French army and navy, the Americans could not mount any serious campaigns against the remaining British possessions in North America.[8] The French viewed the victory at Yorktown as an end to the war in the colonies, thus they turned their attention to the Caribbean, and the French troops in America desired to return home.[9] The situation for the various combatants following the war’s end demonstrates a very different victor in the American.

The loss of French support effectively limited American military options from 1781 to 1783. Even before the war officially ended, the Americans faced numerous problems. The American army, camped at Newburgh, New York, was on the verge of a full-scale mutiny, prompting military leaders to seek assistance from the Continental Congress on 6 January 1783.[10] Congress, however, faced its own problems. The nation was broke, the various states bickered over a national monetary system, and Congress was ineffective.[11]

In the end, George Washington quelled the pending revolt and while his leadership averted a mutiny, it did not solve the new nation’s problems. The Americans even had difficulty maintaining order. In New York, riots erupted as the last British soldiers left the city, and order was only restored when American soldiers entered to replace the British.[12] The new United States was bankrupt, politically disjointed, and in no position to defend itself from internal or external threats. The other powers arrayed against Great Britain in the late war were in an even worse situation.

            Spain was an already declining Empire when the American Revolution broke out and she joined the war against the British in 1779. In the early part of the century, Spain conducted military operations only at the agreement of the British and French and were forced into military alliances by one or the other of those powers.[13] In the mid-century, the Spanish fared far worse. Their involvement in the Seven Years’ War resulted in the loss of all lands east of the Mississippi River, including Florida in exchange for the British returning Havana.[14] The Seven Years’ War effectively broke Spanish power and her failed attempts to regain some power of prestige at Great Britain’s expense during the American Revolution failed, save for the restoration of Florida and Minorca in the peace of 1783.[15] The Spanish went on to lose the remnants of their Empire to the United States in 1898, and the British maintain a presence on Gibraltar to this day.

            France acquired Louisiana in the peace negotiations and would eventually gain the entire Louisiana Territory in 1800, and while they felt they had cleaned the stain of 1763 from French pride, their country was in financial ruin and was bankrupt by 1783 having funded the Americans with loans in lieu of taxes.[16] By 1789, the situation in France was at the boiling point and they fell into their own revolution, which led to the rise of Napoleon. This ushered in the last great French Empire and the final global war for imperial domination for one hundred years until August 1914 once again witnessed the European powers engage in a large-scale war.

            In contrast, Great Britain did not succumb to revolution or despair. The British built a second great Empire, beginning in Australia in 1780, and by establishing new colonies and increasing investment in old colonies in Africa, Asia, and Canada, they added to their Empire.[17] The British economy went on to thrive, by 1801 the British were exporting almost twenty-five million pounds worth of goods, and by 1832, that number rose to over sixty-five million pounds worth of goods.[18] The British also learned from the lessons of the American Revolution. They re-established their continental presence and remained a force in European politics. The Royal Navy proved a powerful force once again against the French and Napoleon. The British re-connection with the continent enabled her to secure allies and form coalitions against the French during the Napoleonic Wars, a vital factor to victory.

            The American Revolution began as an uprising of disaffected colonists and grew into another global conflict for Empire. From 1689 to 1815, a series of these conflicts, fought primarily between Great Britain and France, witnessed the British ultimately emerge victorious. During the American Revolution, Great Britain suffered its largest loss, the thirteen colonies, but the British emerged from the conflict strong and better prepared for the final conflicts with France between 1793 and 1815. Eventually, the former rebellious colonies would become the strongest and closest ally of the British and together they would win two world wars, and ironically perhaps, save France in both.

---

[1] Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 592.

[2] Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves, How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004), 313.

[3] Andrew Kippis, “Extract from a pamphlet on the Peace Preliminaries of 1783,” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 735.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783 (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 660.

[6] Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 360.

[7] Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, 658.

[8] John Ferling, Almost a Miracle, The American Victory in the War of Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 546.

[9] Ibid.

[10] William M. Fowler, Jr., American Crisis, George Washington and the Dangerous Two Years After Yorktown, 1781-1783 (New York: Walker & Company, 2011), 1.

[11] Ibid., 2.

[12] Ibid., 229-230.

[13] Henry Kamen, Empire, How Spain Became a World Power 1492-1763 (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2003), 455.

[14] Ibid., 484.

[15] Brendan Simms, Europe, The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 131.

[16] Ibid., 131-132.

[17] Ibid., 133.

[18] G.R. Porter, “Overseas Trade, Foreign and colonial trade of the United Kingdom, 1801-1832,” ( London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959), 550.

Bibliography

Ferling, John. Almost a Miracle, The American Victory in the War of Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Fowler, Jr., William M. American Crisis, George Washington and the Dangerous Two Years After Yorktown, 1781-1783. New York: Walker & Company, 2011.

Herman, Arthur. To Rule the Waves, How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004.

Kamen, Henry. Empire, How Spain Became a World Power 1492-1763. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2003.

Kippis, Andrew. “Extract from a pamphlet on the Peace Preliminaries of 1783.” In English Historical Documents, Volume X, 1714-1783, by David C., Ed. Douglas, 735-736. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Middlekauff, Robert. The Glorious Cause, The American Revolution, 1763-1789. 1982. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

O’Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. The Men Who Lost America, British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.

Porter, G. R. “Overseas Trade, Foreign and colonial trade of the United Kingdom, 1801-1832.” In English Historical Documents, Volume XI, 1783-1832, by David C., Ed. Douglas, 550. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959.

Simms, Brendan. Europe, The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present. New York: Basic Books, 2013.

——–. Three Victories and a Defeat, The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783. New York: Basic Books, 2009.